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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
AND THE POLITICAL BOYCOTT-N.A.A.C.P. v. CLAIBORNE
HARDWARE CO., 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
INTRODUCTION
When several people with a common goal join together to
achieve that goal, are their actions conspiratal or constitutionally
protected? When that concerted action leads to economic losses, is
the action unfair anti-competition or merely effective political per-
suasion? The courts have been troubled by this dichotomy for
years, switching sides with confusing regularity. Civil or criminal
conspiracy has been severely punished because of the greater
threat offered by the concerted actions of a group.' On the other
hand, "the practice of persons sharing common views banding to-
gether to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the Ameri-
can political process.''2
Even when there is no question of criminal or civil conspiracy,
concerted actions have been prohibited for other reasons. While
the first amendment protects freedom of expression,3 when a boy-
cott is the method of expression, there may be a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits combinations in restraint
of trade.4
Commercial boycotts would seem to present the easiest re-
straint-of-trade question for the courts, yet even here, there have
been conflicting decisions.5 Political boycotts raise still more diffi-
1. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448 (1949) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
2. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkley, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 434, (1981);
see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1963).
3. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, .. or
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976): "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
5. Commercial boycotts, in which the boycotters' objective is profit, are usu-
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cult questions by bringing the first amendment into action.6 Politi-
cal boycotts may cause substantial economic losses, may even have
a restraining effect on trade, yet such concerted action is often the
only non-violent method of affecting constructive change open to
the average citizen.
With the present trend toward consumer activism, the legal
status of boycotts becomes of paramount importance. Over the
past several years, various groups have boycotted a host of prod-
ucts and producers including beef, eggs, wine, and infant formula,
Campbell's, Libby, NBC, and Annheusar-Busch. 8
Although it offers no comprehensive solution, the Supreme
Court has finally addressed some of the questions raised by the
political boycott dilemma. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.9
the Court held that the first amendment protected all but the few
violent elements of a black boycott of white businesses, and that
the state court was precluded from imposing liability for business
losses on all boycott participants rather than on the violent few.
THE CASE
In late 1965 Charles Evers, Mississippi Field Secretary for the
NAACP, helped to organize a chapter of the NAACP in Claiborne
County, Mississippi.10 In March of the following year, a petition
was submitted by the Claiborne County Chapter to several public
officials in Port Gibson, the county seat." The petition contained a
ally held illegal per se. However, when commercial entities organize, not to dam-
age competition but to promote some political or social cause, the Sherman Act
analysis becomes more complicated. Fishman, Entities & Political Boycotts: First
Amendment Protections versus Sherman Act Prohibitions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 391,
397 (1982). Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Service Station Dealers Ass'n, 499
F. Supp. 553 (D. Del. 1980); Crown Century Petroleum Corp. v. Waldeman, 486 F.
Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. Political or protest boycotts, employed by activist groups are motivated by
non-commercial objectives and do not involve entities in commercial competition.
Allegra, Protest Boycotts as Restraints of Trade under the Sherman Act: A Pro-
posed Standard, 30 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 221, 222 (1981); Missouri v. NOW, 620
F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980); Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Kirk-
land v. Wallace, 403 F.2d 413 (5th cir. 1968).
7. Note, Anti-trust-First Amendment, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 326 (1980).
8. Harris, Political, Social, and Economic Boycotts by Consumers: Do They
Violate the Sherman Act?, 17 HOUSTON L. REV. 775, 778-80 (1980).
9. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
10. Id. at 3418.
11. Id.
[Vol. 5:359
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list of requests aimed at securing racial equality for the black citi-
zens of Port Gibson.1 2 The list included requests for appointment
of black police officers, desegregation of public schools, extension
of public improvements to black residential areas, the selection of
blacks to jury duty and the desegregation of the county hospital.18
Additional requests, added a week later, asked that blacks be em-
ployed in local stores as clerks and cashiers." These requests had
little effect, and on April 1, 1966, the Claiborne County NAACP, at
a meeting attended by several hundred blacks, voted unanimously
to boycott white merchants in Port Gibson. 5
The boycott, besides the refusal of the members to deal with
white merchants, included efforts to persuade other blacks to join
the cause. "Storewatchers" were posed outside target stores to take
the names of those blacks who continued to deal with white
merchants. 6 These people were later denounced by name at
NAACP meetings.1 7
In addition to the storewatching, peaceful pickets were con-
ducted around the stores boycotted, and those entering the stores
were urged to honor the boycott." Some members of the boycott
who were "storewatchers" wore black hats and clothing and be-
came know as the "Deacons" or the "Blackhats."1 Testimony at
trial described these "watchers" as a "quasi-military" group organ-
ized to "patrol" the boycotted area. 0
During the early months of the boycott, several violent inci-
dents occurred. In April, 1966, shots were fired into the home of a
black couple who patronized a white-owned dry cleaner.2 In June,
1966, a brick was thrown through the windshield of the car of a
man who had been patronizing white merchants (and who contin-
ued to do so after the incident).2 Birdshot was fired into the home
12. Id.
13. NAACP v. Claiborne, 393 So. 2d 1290, 1295-96 (Miss. 1981).
14. Id. at 1296.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 3414. Several of these merchants also acted as public offi-
cials and civil leaders in Port Gibson. These included two aldermen, a member of
the Mississippi House of Representatives, two school board members, and a mem-
ber of the county Democratic Committee.
16. Id. at 3421.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 3420.
19. Id. at 3421.
20. 393 So. 2d at 1298.
21. 102 S. Ct. at 3422.
22. Id. at 3421.
19831
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of James Gilmore on August 22, 1966. Gilmore, who had ignored
the boycott, caught the three young black men whom he believed
had fired the shots .2 These men, active supporters of the boycott,
were tried and convicted, but their conviction was set aside on ap-
peal.2 4 Another black citizen who ignored the boycott received
threatening phone calls and, in November, 1966, shotgun pellets
were fired into the walls of her home. 5 She nevertheless continued
to shop in white-owned stores.26
Other incidents involving threats and intimidation occurred,
but the evidence linking those occurrences to the boycott was less
clear.27 The only other specific incident linked to the boycott was
the decision of the Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc. (MAP) to
deal only with black merchants in Claiborne County. 8 One of
MAP's programs-Head Start-involved the use of federal funds
to purchase food for under-privileged children.2 9 After February,
1967, all such purchases were made from black-owned stores
only.30 Meanwhile, the boycott continued.
In early 1967, the county's first black policeman was hired,"
and one of the boycotted stores hired a black cashier. 2 The boy-
cott ceased for some time," but was reimposed following the assas-
sination of Dr. Martin Luther King in April, 1968."4 Tension in
Port Gibson increased," but no violence ensued. The boycott was
lifted again in May, 1968, and remained lifted for almost a year.3 6
Then, on April 18, 1969, a black man was shot and killed in an
23. Id.
24. Whitney v. State, 205 So. 2d 284 (Miss. 1967).
25. 102 S. Ct. at 3421.
26. Id.
27. A bottle of whiskey purchased at a white-owned store was taken from a
black man by a NAACP member. A commercial fisherman who had ignored the
boycott was beaten, but his assailants testified that the incident resulted from a
car accident, not the boycott. A teenager, acting on his own initiative, destroyed
the flower garden of an elderly black woman who purchased groceries at a white-
owned store. 102 S.Ct. at 3421-22.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 3419.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3420.
32. Id. at 3420 n.30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
[Vol. 5:359
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encounter with two Port Gibson policemen.s7 Tension again ran
high, with large crowds gathering at the local hospital and
church. 8 On the next day, April 19, Charles Evers, the NAACP
Field Secretary, spoke to a large group and led a march to the
courthouse where he demanded the discharge of the Port Gibson
police force.89 The boycott was reimposed, and in one of his
speeches, Evers stated that all boycot violators would be "disci-
plined."'40 Aaron Henry, president of the Mississippi NAACP, came
to Port Gibson on April 20 and spoke to members of the Claiborne
County chapter of the NAACP, urging moderation.4" Evers spoke
again the next day. His speech was unrecorded, but he allegedly
threatened to break the necks of boycott violators.4
Despite the many speeches, the tension and the threats, no
violence followed the April, 1969 incident.4 In October 1969, sev-
eral of the boycotted merchants 44 filed suit in state court to enjoin
the boycott and to recover losses caused by the boycott. 4' No vio-
lence occurred following the filing of this suit.46
The suit was delayed by collateral proceedings in United
States District Court 47 until June, 1973, when trial finally began
before a chancellor.48 After a lengthy trial with 144 witnesses, the
chancellor issued an opinion in August, 1976, finding joint and sev-
eral liability of 130 of the defendants on three counts of conspir-
acy.49 The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed in part and af-
firmed in part, finding the entire boycott illegal due to violence
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 3422.
44. See supra note 14.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 3414. The Complaint named as defendants the NAACP, a
New York membership corporation; Mississippi Action for Progress, Inc., a Mis-
sissippi corporation involved in the "Head Start" program; Aaron Henry, presi-
dent of the Mississippi Branch of the NAACP; Charles Evers, Field Secretary of
the NAACP in Mississippi; and 144 other individual participants in the boycott.
46. Id. at 3420.
47. Id. at 3414 n.5.
48. Id. at 3414.
49. Id. Sixteen of the original 148 defendants were dismissed by stipulation
of counsel. One had been misidentified in the complaint. Aaron Henry was dis-
missed because the plaintiffs failed to meet the burden of proof as to his wrong
doing.
1983]
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and affirming the defendants' liability on a theory of conspiracy."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
the possible First Amendment implications."
BACKGROUND
Political boycotts52 have a long and illustrious history in
America, beginning with the boycott of British goods which fol-
lowed the revolutionary Boston Tea Party.5 3 Many of the Framers
of the Constitution, including Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, supported that boycott and served on committees to en-
force it.5 4 Americans continued to use boycotts to express their po-
litical beliefs-against slave-made goods prior to the Civil War55
and against the "sweatshops" of the Industrial Revolution. 6 When
the civil rights struggles of this century began, a boycott was used
effectively to end discrimination against blacks by an Alabama bus
system.5 7
However, prior to its Claiborne decision, the Supreme Court
had never dealt directly with the question of political boycotts and
their first amendment protection. Instead, the Court had dealt
with the individual elements of political boycotts. The freedom to
associate in order to advance the first amendment freedoms of
speech, assembly and petition was recognized in NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel Patterson.8 The Court had already upheld the use of
50. Id. at 3416. The Mississippi Court found the state's secondary boycott
statute inapplicable and held that the restraint-of-trade statute also did not
apply.
51. - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 565 (1982).
52. The term "boycott" did not come into use until 1880 when outraged Irish
tenant farmers refused to deal with land agent Charles Boycott. H. TOULMIN, JR.,
A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (1949). Even
though the actions of the revoluntionary colonists anticipated Boycott by over one
hundred years, the classic term clearly fits those actions.
53. C. ANDREWS, THE BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE NON-IMPORTATION MOVE-
MENT 40-43 (1968 ed.); A. SCHLESSINGER, THE COLONIAL AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 76-83 (1939 ed.).
54. H. COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 77-78, 80 (1963 ed.);
R. KETCHUM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 61, 63 (1971).
55. H. LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGGLE 55 (1913).
56. Id. at 33-35.
57. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 749-50 (1976); M.L. KING, STRIDE TOWARD
FREEDOM (1958).
58. 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977).
364 [Vol. 5:359
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the streets and other public places as a public forum" and had
protected the rights to peaceful picketing0 and to distribution of
leaflets." By 1963 the Court was upholding the right to march and
to demonstrate peacefully.
62
The freedom to associate and to express beliefs was not merely
a protection of abstract discussions. "The First Amendment also
protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against gov-
ernmental intrusion." 63 Such freedom to air grievances about pub-
lic issues was said to "rest on the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values." 4 Nor did a coercive effect place these
expressions outside the first amendment; "so long as the means are
peaceful, the communications need not meet standards of
acceptability." 5
The Supreme Court has also spoken on the questions of indi-
vidual liability for the actions of associated members. Absent spe-
cific evidence of individual responsibility, those who associated for
political reasons were not responsible for their associates' illegal
acts.6 It was not enough that the individul knew of the unlawful
goals and means.6 To be liable, he had to know of the organiza-
tion's unlawful goars and specifically intend to further those illegal
aims. 8 Even speech which advocated unlawful conduct received
59. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
60. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). In the most recent case to ad-
dress the question of picketing and distributing leaflets, the Court struck down
Title 40 U.S.C. § 13k, holding the statute unconstitutional as an unreasonable
restriction on First Amendment rights. The statute barred "the display [of] any
flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into notice any party, organi-
zation, or movement" in the United States Supreme Court building or on its
grounds. Since the grounds, by statute, include the sidewalks, § 13k prohibited
appellees from carrying a picket sign containing the text of the First Amendment
and from distributing leaflets. The Court held that the public sidewalks surround-
ing the Court grounds were no different from other public sidewalks. The absolute
ban on the use of the sidewalks as a public forum was an unnecessarily broad
restriction. United States v. Grace, 51 U.S.L.W. 444 (U.S. April 19, 1983)(No. 81-
1863).
61. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
62. Edwards v. South Carolina, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
63. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
64. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466 (1980).
65. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
66. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961).
67. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966).
68. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
1983] 365
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first amendment protection.69
So long as the methods of an association were lawful, its ac-
tions were protected. Even when some of the actions were illegal,
the only damages which could be recovered were those which were
"the direct consequences of such [illegal] conduct and [did] not
include consequences from" peaceful methods of expression. 0
Although there has been some suggestion that the freedom of
association may no longer be protected by the strict scrutiny test
of the past,71 the above cases have presented the lower federal
courts with a guideline for deciding cases which deal specifically
with political boycotts. The courts must grant protection to politi-
cal expression and hold liable only those who intentionally further
illegal aims. Yet, even with this guideline, there has been some
confusion.
Major confusion and differences of decisions have resulted
from attempts to distinguish between purely political boycotts by
noncommercial organizations and political boycotts by commercial
organizations in order to answer restraint-of-trade questions."2
Some courts have attempted to balance the governmental interest
in protecting free competition in the market against the boycot-
ters' interest in freedom of expression.7" Others have found an une-
quivocal right to political persuasion unhampered by any consider-
ation of the anti-competitive effect.74
Many commentators have suggested different solutions for the
problems. Some feel that even non-commercial boycotts may be
prohibited by the Constitution.75 One has suggested that a narrow
69. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982).
70. United Mine Workers v. Gibb, 383 U.S. 715, 729 (1966).
71. Young and Herbert, Political Association Under the Burger Court: Fad-
ing Protection, 15 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 53 (1981).
72. Crown Century Corp. v. Waldeman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), rev'd on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1980); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Ser-
vice Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D.Del. 1980); for a discussion of
these cases and issues, see also, Allegra, Protest Boycotts as Restraints of Trade
Under the Sherman Act: A Proposed Standard, 30 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 221 (1981).
73. Osborn, supra note 71 at 553; Crown Century, supra note 71 at 759; Mis-
souri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301, 1324 (8th Cir.) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 842 (1980).
74. Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Kirkland v. Wallace,
403 F.2d 413 (5th cir. 1968).
75. Note, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131
(1980); Note, Constitutional Rights of Non-commercial Boycotts: A Delicate Bal-
[Vol. 5:359
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definition of conspiracy may allow for distinguishing between anti-
competitive refusals to deal and the right to be politically persua-
sive."' Another suggestion has been to apply Sherman Act analysis
only to those boycotts which have a sufficiently anti-competitive
effect to warrant anti-trust prohibitions.7
The Supreme Court itself has never offered a specific answer
to the questions raised by the political boycott, anti-trust problem.
However, some of the issues were raised in Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.78 In that case, a
group of trucking companies brought an anti-trust suit against sev-
eral railroads and a railroad association who had combined in a
campaign to foster adoption of laws destructive to the trucking in-
dustry. In addition, the railroad group hired a public relations firm
to create distaste for truckers among the general public. The Court
found no violation of the Sherman Act can be based on attempts
to influence the passage of legislation. 9 Such action is specifically
protected by the right to petition the government, and was not the
intended target of the Sherman Act.80 The Court considered the
legislative history of the Act and decided that it excluded political
activity such as that of the railroads in the Noerr case.l
A narrow interpretation of Noerr would limit it to cases in
which the concerted action was aimed at influencing the passage of
specifically restraining legislation. However, in Missouri v. NOW,81
the Eighth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Noerr court and
decided that a convention boycott organized by the National Asso-
ciation of Women in an attempt to influence Missouri's vote on the
Equal Rights Amendment was not covered by the Sherman Act.
The court saw the primary question to be "the applicability of the
Sherman Act to a politically motivated but economically tooled
boycott participated in and organized by non-competitors of those
who suffered as a result of the boycott."83 That court found that
ance, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 773 (1982).
76. Note, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HAMV. L.
REV. 659 (1978).
77. Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amend-
ment: An Accomodation of Conflicting Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 983 (1982).
78. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
79. Id. at 137.
80. Id. at 136.
81. Id. at 137.
82. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
83. Id. at 1302.
1983]
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"using a boycott in a non-competitive political arena for the pur-
pose of influencing legislation is not prescribed by the Sherman
Act." 4 While claiming to base its decision squarely on the Noerr
precedent, the NOW court admitted that the Sherman Act ques-
tion had never been specifically addressed by the Supreme Court,
which left lower courts without definite guidelines, forcing them to
draw inferences and make educated guesses.8 5 Missouri appealed
the Eighth Circuit's decision, but the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari, 86 leaving the Sherman Act question unanswered.
As a solution to the tangle presented by these conflicting deci-
sions and suggestions, the Claiborne decision is not entirely con-
clusive. It answers some questions but raises others.
ANALYSIS
The decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.8 7 "fos-
tered the right to associate by removing civil liability imposed on a
group that had conspired to carry out a politically motivated eco-
nomic boycott."8 8 The case is the most recent in a long line of cases
brought by or against the NACCP, seeking to vindicate protected
associational rights.89
Writing for a seven-member majority, Justice Stevens estab-
lished at the outset a constitutional protection for the non-violent
elements of a political boycott.90 The peaceful picketing, the
marches and demonstrations were all protected first amendment
freedoms.9 In addition, the speech of the boycotters, even though
coercive and threatening social ostracism did not "lose its pro-
tected character ...simply because it may embarrass others or
coerce them into action." 92
84. Id. at 1315.
85. Id. at 1309.
86. 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
87. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
88. Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.REv. 171 (1982).
89. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); Louisianna ex rel Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
90. Justice Rehnquist concurred without opinion, and Justice Marshall took
no part in the decision. 102 S. Ct. at 3437.
91. Id. at 3424; see also, notes 58-65, supra, and accompanying text.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 3424.
[Vol. 5:359
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Once he established the constitutional protection of the boy-
cott, Justice Stevens set out the limits on that protection. Using
the test established in United States v. O'Brien93 he recognized
that "[gjovernmental regulation that has an incidental effect on
First Amendment freedoms may be justified in certain narrowly
defined instances." '94 For example, both the federal and state gov-
ernments have broad powers to regulate economic activities. How-
ever, where the State completely prohibited a non-violent boycott
aimed, not at destroying economic competition, but at petitioning
for governmental change, the State has gone beyond its rightful
power and infringed upon constitutional guarantees.95
Justice Stevens barely remarked upon the restraint-of-trade
issue. In a brief paragraph, he stated that "a major purpose of the
boycott in this case was to influence governmental action."9 ' The
fact that the boycott was directed not at the government but at
merchants was ignored. Citing Missouri v. NOW,97 Justice Stevens
implied that when the right to petition is involved, there is very
little that could justify the state's interference, even with a boycott
which causes economic damage.9 8
Technically, Justice Steven's brief discussion of the restraint-
of-trade issue was justified by the opinion of the Mississippi Su-
preme Court. When considering the issue, the lower court ignored
subtleties and questions and stated bluntly that "[t]he United
States Supreme Court has seen fit to hold boycotts to achieve po-
litical ends are not a violation of the Sherman Act. . ."" That
there has never been such a specific decision by the Supreme Court
was not mentioned. To support its conclusion, the state court cited
the Noerr and the NOW decisions,100 although neither decisions
was on point.
Whether the lower court was being obtuse, or merely playing
it safe, its reasoning clearly illuminated the problems involved in
the Supreme Court's refusal to precisely answer the Sherman Act
question. After a polite nod at the Sherman Act, the Mississippi
Supreme Court simply decided that "we find that the present deci-
93. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
94. 102 S. Ct. at 3425.
95. Id. at 3426.
96. Id.
97. 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
98. 102 S. Ct. at 3427, n.48.
99. 393 So. 2d at 1302.
100. Id.
1983]
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sion [to prohibit the boycott and find the NACCP liable] may be
made without application of the restraint of trade statute."10 1
The court then decided the case on a variety of other factors,
forcing the Supreme Court, in its reversal, to examine a myriad of
sub-issues rather than the basic question of political boycotts in
general. By considering the specific facts of the case, by weighing
degrees of violence, and by applying a group of cases decided on
other first amendment grounds, the Court managed to find that
the boycott in the Claiborne case was constitutionally protected,
and the action of the Mississippi Supreme Court in prohibiting it
was unconstitutional.
The Court's finding directly contradicted the findings of both
the Mississippi Chancery Court and the Mississippi Supreme
Court.10 2 Both Mississippi courts relied heavily on the conclusion
that the entire boycott was illegal because of the illegal violence
which had been associated with it. The chancellor found that "a
thread of fear and violence [was] .woven throughout this case."'03
The state supreme court emphasized that "evidence shows that the
volition of many black persons was overcome out of sheer fear, and
they were forced and compelled against their wills to withold their
trade and business intercourse from the complainants.' ' 0 4 That
court's finding of liability was based on its conclusion that the
boycotters "agreed [to] use illegal force, violence and threats" to
achieve their ends.10 5
The Mississippi courts appeared predisposed to find the activ-
ities of the boycotters illegal, relying on earlier state decisions re-
garding boycotts. 06 The United States Supreme Court, however,
approached the question from the opposite point of view, presum-
ing the boycott to be legal unless thoroughly tainted by violence. 07
Both the state courts and the Supreme Court examined carefully
the elements of violence related to the boycott but reached diame-
tiically opposite conclusions.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1301.
103. Id. at 1298.
104. Id. at 1300.
105. 102 S. Ct. at 3417, n.19.
106. Southern California Leadership Conference v. A.G. Corp., 241 So. 2d
619 (Miss. 1970); Shields v. State, 203 So. 2d 78 (Miss. 1967); Southern Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Rwy. and Motor Coach Employees,
205 Miss. 354, 38 So. 2d' 765 (1949).
107. 102 S. Ct. at 3423.
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The contradictory conclusions clearly illustrated the problem
with the Supreme Court's holding in Claiborne. As long as the
lower courts are required to decide political boycott decisions on a
case by case basis, examining each for degrees of violence or meth-
ods of implementation, there will always remain a conflict of deci-
sions. As the Mississippi Supreme Court did in this case, future
state courts may view the specific facts in a light entirely different
from that of the U.S. Supreme Court. Without a clear first amend-
ment protection for boycotts, the state courts may presume a legit-
imate state interest and reach their decisions without regard for
possible constitutional overtones.
In the Claiborne case, the Mississippi courts began with the
assumption that the threats and vilification employed by the
boycotters were illegal. The state supreme court relied, in part, on
a state statute which made it illegal "to threaten with bodily harm,
initimidate, or coerce a person to prevent, [him] from doing busi-
ness with another."'08 In fact, one of the boycotters was tried in a
criminal case based on that statute, but his conviction was re-
versed due to a discriminatory jury list.1'09
Once it found that the threats and denunciations were illegal,
the Mississippi Supreme Court had no trouble deciding that those
threats were inextricably interwined with the actual violence,
thereby tainting the entire boycott. The United States Supreme
Court, however, began with presumption that "[s]peech does not
lose its protected character simply because it may embarrass other
or coerce them into action." 1 0 The Court apparently considered
possible first amendment violations to be more serious than the
economic losses to the merchants of Port Gibson. Since the threats
and denunciations, commonly made by many of the boycotters,
were not, in the opinion of the Court, illegal activities, the Court
had no difficulty in separating what it considered isolated incidents
of violence from "essential political speech lying at the core of the
first amendment." ' The Court implied that, even though the vio-
lence may have arisen out of the atmosphere created by the boy-
cott, the seriousness of the violence was not sufficient to override
108. 393 So. 2d at 1301, referring to MississiPPI CODE ANNOTATED, § 97-23-83
(1972).
109. Shields v. State, 203 So. 2d 78 (Miss. 1967).
110. 102 S. Ct. at 3424.
111. Id. at 3427, quoting Henry v. First Nat'l Bank of Clarksdale 595 F. 2d
291, 303 (1979), the collateral proceeding which delayed the Claiborne case.
19831
13
Cohoon: Constitutional Law - Freedom of Association and the Political Boy
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
the protection of the first amendment freedoms." 2
After determining that the boycott as a whole was not illegal,
Justice Stevens next considered the issue of damages. While the
states have the right to impose tort liabilities for business losses
caused by violence, when constitutional guarantees are involved,
"precision of regulation" is required.'1 3 To determine the grounds
on which liability may be based and on whom it may be imposed,
Justice Stevens looked to the Court's decision in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs."4 That decision held that only damages directly
traceable to violent, unprotected conduct could be recovered,'"
and such liability could only be imposed on those specifically
proven responsible for the violence." 6
As Justice Stevens pointed out, the Mississippi Supreme
Court decision failed to demonstrate that all the "business losses
were proximately caused by violence and threats of violence found
to be present.""" The state court also failed to demonstrate that
any of the named petitioners were specifically responsible for any
of the violent incidents. Attendance at NAACP meetings and par-
ticipation in protected activities such as marching and picketing
were not sufficient to impose liability."'
Up to this point, the United States Supreme Court's reasoning
on the issue of damages followed traditional lines. However, in de-
ciding there was no basis for imposing liability on Charles Evers or
the NACCP, the Court strayed from the traditional analysis of first
amendment protections to a more unusual interpretation.
According to Justice Stevens, Evers' speeches were within the
constitutional protections established by Schneck v. United
States"9 and Brandenburg v. Ohio.20 By that test, Justice Stevens
pointed out, "[tihe mere advocacy of the use of force or violence
112. The Court has found violence to outweigh first amendment freedoms in
only one case. In Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287
(1941), the Court upheld an injunction against non-violent as well as violent activ-
ities related to union picketing. In that case, the violence was considered to be
pervasive. Buildings were bombed, trucks wrecked, stores burned, and partici-
pants severely beaten.
113. 102 S. Ct. at 3428.
114. 383 U.S. at 715 (1966).
115. Id. at 729.
116. 102 S. Ct. at 3429; see also, notes 65-69, supra, and accompanying text.
117. 102 S. Ct. at 3430.
118. Id. at 3432.
119. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
120. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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does not remove speech from the protection for the First
Amendment."''
However, under the traditional interpretation of the "clear
and present danger test" of Brandenburg, if Evers' speeches were
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
[were] likely to incite or produce such action,"' 22 those speeches
would not be protected. Although there was no evidence that Ev-
ers' speeches did in fact incite violence or were followed by acts of
violence, the test requires only that there be a likelihood of "immi-
nent lawless action." Under the circumstances, there was every
likelihood that Evers' threats of discipline and broken necks would
result in violence. The fact that no such violence ensued should,
under traditional analysis, be immaterial. The Court, however, was
satisfied with the finding that, since no violence followed Evers'
speeches, those speeches were protected. Since the Court claimed
to be applying the standard "clear and present danger" test, it is
difficult to determine whether this interpretation was intended to
be a new application of the old test, or merely a special interpreta-
tion for this case only. Either way this anomaly poses yet another
pitfall for lower courts deciding political boycott cases.
The Court further confused the issue in its answer to the ques-
tion of vicarious liability of the NAACP. Since the only ground for
imposing liability on the NAACP would have been as principal to
Evers' agent, that basis for liability was also lost. Since Evers was
not liable, according to the Court, neither was the NAACP.' 23
However, in dicta, Justice Stevens indicated that, even had Evers
been found liable, the NACCP would not have been vicariously lia-
ble unless it has authorized or ratified the unlawful conduct. 24
Here, the Court again claimed to be applying traditional
rules-the standard rules of agency-finding that the
"NACCP-like any other organization-of course may be held re-
sponsible for the acts of its agents throughout the country that are
undertaken within the scope of their actual or apparent author-
ity.'' 1 5 However, the Court found that there was no such authority
here since the NAACP had demonstrated that Evers' threats of
discipline and broken necks were contrary to NAACP policy.' 26
121. 102 S. Ct. at 3433.
122. 395 U.S. at 447.
123. 102 S. Ct. at 3424.
124. Id. at 3435.
125. Id. at 3435.
126. Id.
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This is an unusual interpretation of agency doctrine. Accord-
ing to standard interpretation, tortious acts of an agent, even when
contrary to specific directions, may be imputed to the principal if
the agent's acts are of the general type authorized by the princi-
ple.127 Evers was authorized to make speeches, organize NAACP
chapters, and promote boycotts in Mississippi.128 His comments
concerning discipline of boycott violators could easily fall within
the class of authorized actions. Since the NAACP knew about Ev-
ers' actions' 29 but made no attempts to inhibit him,130 it is possible
to find that the NAACP aquiesed to those actions and could be
held vicariously liable.
The Court's reasoning, which would not impute Evers' actions
to the NAACP, implied that the test for vicarious liability may be
applied differently to political associations. This conclusion is es-
pecially likely in light of the Court's decision, only a month before
Claiborne, to hold a non-profit professional organization liable for
the tortious acts of its agents which were directly contrary to the
organization's policies and interests.' 3 ' Had it used such reasoning
in Claiborne, with a political rather than a professional association,
the NAACP would have been found vicarously liable if Evers was
liable. The Court apparently felt that when agency doctrine might
infringe upon the exercise of constitutional rights, the standard
rules must be subjected to restrictions to prevent a chilling effect.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, "[t]he rights of political associa-
tion are fragile enough without adding the additional threat of de-
struction by lawsuit.' 32 However, the Court's reinterpretation of
standard doctrine once again serves to increases the confusion sur-
rounding the problem of political and social boycotts.
CONCLUSION
The decision in NACCP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.13
presented the Court with an opportunity to answer the questions
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216, 231 (1958).
128. Joint Appendix to Petitioners' & Respondents' Briefs at 441-42, 456-58,
Claiborne Hardware (No. 81-202).
129. Id.
130. 102 S. Ct. at 3435.
131. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S.
Ct. 1935 (1982).
132. 102 S. Ct. at 3436, quoting NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
133. 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982).
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concerning the issue of political boycotts. Following the Court's de-
cision in Claiborne, one activist group decided to go ahead with a
boycott which had previously been considered on shaky legal
ground.134
However, such reliance on the legality of boycotts may be pre-
mature. Although the popular press may think the Court's decision
"clearly makes boycotts legal," ' 5 there are many questions still to
be answered. The decision does preclude imposition of civil liabil-
ity on members of political associations for the violent acts of a
few, implying that there must be a more stringent test for vicarious
liability of such associations."3 6 However, the Court mentioned
such a test only in dicta and chose to leave the question of its
application for another time. In addition, there is still some ques-
tion whether the constitutional protection afforded political boy-
cotts extends to other types of non-commercial boycotts and
whether the restriction on vicarious liability applies to social, cul-
tural, and other non-political-but expressive-forms of associa-
tion. Although it clearly awaited an opportunity to answer the
questions concerning boycotts and anti-competitive conspiracies,
freedom of association and vicarious liability,137 the Supreme
Court has, characteristically, refused to answer all the questions at
once.
Elaine Cohoon
134. Rose, Push Collides with Busch, 106 FORTUNE 90 (1982).
135. Id.
136. 102 S. Ct. at 3435.
137. The Court had an opportunity to answer almost the same questions in
Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
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